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Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of
Horizontal Choice of Law Problems
Stewart E. Sterk*
The diversity of state rules regarding testimonial privileges'
has fostered several interesting and significant choice of law
* Law Clerk to Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel, New York Court
of Appeals. A.B. 1973, Columbia University; J.D. 1976, Columbia Uni-
versity.
1. Privilege law, like the law of evidence in general, has long been
plagued by lack of uniformity. Over the last forty years, several at-
tempts at comprehensive reform of evidence law have been made. See,
e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942); UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1953).
No state legislatures, however, adopted the Model Code; only Kansas and
New Jersey enacted the Uniform Rules and, even in those states, altera-
tions were made. In 1974, the 1953 Uniform Rules were superseded by
a new set of Rules, see UNIFomVa RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1974). No jurisdic-
tion has, as yet, adopted these rules.
While the new Federal Rules of Evidence, which have been promul-
gated in some form in several states, see NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4, chs. 47-53
(1971); NEW MEXICO RULEs OF EVIDENCE 101-1102, 84 N.M. xi (1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. chs. 901-911 (West 1974), may finally bring some uniformity
to evidence law in general, they are not likely to promote any trend
towards uniformity in privilege law. The early drafts of the Federal
Rules contained detailed, if ill-considered, provisions concerning privi-
leges. See Rules 501-513, Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); Rules 501-513, Revised Draft, 51 F.R.D. 315(1971); Rules 501-513, Final Draft, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). See also Krat-
tenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61 (1973). When
finally enacted by Congress, the Rules had been so amended that, of the
entire privilege article, only a modified Rule 501 remained:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,,-
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accord-
ance with State law.
This Rule provides no statutory standards for the federal courts when
jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question and insists
only that state law govern the privilege question as to issues on which
state substantive law is applied, a result arguably compelled by Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Korn, Continuing
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problems. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in
abandoning the inflexible rule that "the law of the forum deter-
mines the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence,"' 2 has
given these important problems some of the attention they
deserve.3 Even the Second Restatement, however, fails to focus
sufficiently on the policies underlying the various privileges.
This Article explores the privilege situation in greater depth and
seeks to provide the courts with additional guidance for making
rational choice of law decisions.
Imagine the plight of a court of state F faced with a suit
by Jones against Smith Corporation alleging breach of an implied
warranty of fitness, based on the following facts. Plaintiff Jones
claims that while vacationing in his home state, C, he contracted
food poisoning after consuming some canned beans manufactured
by Smith Corporation in state F. Jones immediately consulted
Dr. Rich, a fellow vacationer in C, but a permanent resident of
D. The actual content of their conversation remains unknown,
but Jones may have discussed his diet for the day immediately
preceding his illness and the extent of his discomfort, and Dr. Rich
may have made a diagnosis. Smith Corporation seeks to secure
Dr. Rich's testimony concerning the consultation. Dr. Rich is at
home in D, beyond the process of the courts of F, so Smith
Corporation attempts to examine him on deposition in D. Under
the law of state C, no physician-patient privilege exists. F has
a statute, designed to foster free communication between doctor
and patient, which prevents disclosure of such communications
in court, but the privilege is deemed waived when the patient
puts his physical condition in issue.4 D has a broad physician-
patient privilege to protect the patient's privacy from unwar-
ranted intrusion, and only the express consent of the patient can
effect a waiver.
Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 48 F.R.D. 65
(1969).
In its present form, Federal Rule 501 is clearly unsuitable for enact-
ment by state legislatures, since it deals primarily with issues the state
courts do not address. Moreover, the Rule provides no guidance for the
resolution of privilege questions, beyond interpreting the principles of
the common law "in the light of reason and experience." Thus, wide-
spread acceptance of the Federal Rules is unlikely to create greater uni-
formity in the privilege area. For a brief survey of the current state
of disarray in privilege law, see note 8 infra.
2. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 597 (1934).
3. See RESTATEXMNT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1971)
and accompanying comment. Section 139 is quoted in text accompany-
ing note 54 and in note 81 infra.
4. See, e.g., Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wash. 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968).
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Should the court in F authorize a deposition of Dr. Rich? The
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws would treat this as
a mere question of evidence, to be determined by application of
F's own law.5 Thus, since F's statute would not permit disclo-
sure until Jones actually puts his physical condition in issue,
Smith Corporation would not immediately be entitled to Dr.
Rich's testimony. Since the disputed conversation took place in
a state which recognizes no privilege at all, were the court in
F following the Second Restatement it would order the deposi-
tion.6 If F instead approached choice of law questions by apply-
ing governmental interest analysis, 7 before the court could decide
whether to order the deposition, it would have to determine the
interests of the forum state, the state with the most significant
relation to the communication, and the deposition state.
The problem is a complex one. Jones cannot claim that he
relied on the existence of a privilege in communicating with Dr.
Rich because C, the site of the conversation, recognizes no privi-
lege at all. F has an interest in encouraging communications
between doctor and patient, but allowing the testimony might
not interfere with this policy because the communication took
place in C rather than in F. The F court might, by asserting
that D has no interest in the controversy, choose to ignore D's in-
terest in protecting the privacy of all patients. To complicate
matters further, however, even if the court in F decided that
the deposition should proceed, were Dr. Rich to challenge Smith
Corporation's attempt to learn the contents of his conversation
with Jones, a D court, recognizing that state's statute and policy,
might not permit the testimony.
The hypothetical situation described above is well within the
realm of possibility, since most testimonial privileges are recog-
nized in some, but not all, jurisdictions,8 and the scope and
5. REsTATEI NT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 597 (1934).
6. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
7. The various commentators who favor interest analysis have dif-
ferent rules for resolving choice of law problems. See note 26 infra.
8. The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, universally
honored, but because it is primarily a matter of federal constitutional
law, it poses no significant choice of law problems and will not be dis-
cussed further. If, however, one state decided to recognize a broader
self-incrimination privilege than the one mandated by the federal consti-
tution, choice of law problems could arise.
Among communications privileges, on which this Article focuses,
only the attorney-client privilege is recognized in every state. Its scope,
however, varies from state to state. Compare N.Y. Civ. PPsc. LAw. §
4503 (McKinney Supp. 1976) with Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minm 40,
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limitations of many privileges vary widely from state to state.9
43-44, 124 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1963). All but three states, Alabama, Mis-
sissippi, and New Hampshire, recognize a privilege for communications
between priest and penitent. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4505 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1976); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1966).
The physician-patient privilege is recognized in approximately two-
thirds of the states, see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West Supp.
1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976). In
some states, psychiatrists are covered by the physician-patient privilege,
e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw. § 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1976), but in others,
there is a separate psychiatrist-patient privilege, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 51, § 5.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976). In recent years there has been
a growing trend towards protecting communications between psycholo-
gists and clients, and almost half of the states now accord such protection
in some form. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4507 (McKinney Supp.
1976). California has enacted a comprehensive psychotherapist-patient
privilege. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1027 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
A handful of states also recognize privileges for confidential com-
munications between accountant and client, see, e.g., IND. CODE § 25-2-
1-23 (1974), journalist and source, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §
111 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976), school staff member and student, see,
e.g., KY. REV. STAT. 421.216 (Supp. 1976), and social worker and client,
see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
Two separate privileges attach to the marital relationship. Confi-
dential communications made between husband and wife during mar-
riage (the marital communications privilege) are privileged in all the
states, although early drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence attempted
to eliminate this privilege. See Rule 505 of the various drafts of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971);
56 F.R.D. 183 (1972), and the Advisory Committee's Note. The other
marital privilege protects one spouse from adverse testimony by the
other, whether or not the testimony relates to communications (the anti-
spousal or anti-marital privilege). Although universally recognized at
common law, it has been abolished by statute in approximately a dozen
states, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1966), and se-
verely restricted in many others, see, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PAC. LAW § 4502
(a) (McKinney 1963).
9. Waiver rules, for instance, vary widely depending upon the
privilege and the state. Many states deem the physician-patient privi-
lege waived whenever the patient puts his physical condition in issue,
see, e.g., San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1951); Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wash. 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968), while others
find an implied waiver as soon as the patient commences a personal in-
jury action, see, e.g., Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966).
In the case of the anti-spousal privilege, different states have differ-
ent rules as to who may assert it. In some states anti-spousal testimony
is absolutely incompetent, see, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 1-142 (Supp. 1975), in
others the party spouse can prevent the testimony, see, e.g., Mica. Compi.
LAws ANN. § 600.2162 (West 1968), while in still others only the witness
spouse can refuse to testify, see, e.g., CAL. Evw. CODE § 970 (West 1966).
Some states restrict the priest-penitent privilege to clergymen who
are "authorized or accustomed to hear, and [have] a duty to keep secret,
penitential communications." See, e.g., UiFoRm RuLE OF EVIDENCE 29
(1) (a) (1953). Such a formulation benefits primarily, if not ex-
clusively, Catholic priests and penitents seeking to maintain the confi-
[Vol. 61:461
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Thus, a horizontal'0 choice of law question can arise whenever
a privilege claim is asserted in a court of the forum state to pro-
tect a communication made in another state. The choice of law
problem is even more complex when testimony about an argu-
ably privileged communication is sought not at trial but on
deposition outside the forum.
Formerly, these choice of law problems were simplistically
resolved by application of the First Restatement's principle that
the forum's evidentiary rules should govern in cases of con-
flict." Although the law of evidence has developed principally
to ensure that "the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined,"' 2 testimonial privileges are often recog-
nized for reasons unrelated to efficiency and accuracy in adjudi-
cation. The broad forum-oriented rule used to resolve eviden-
tiary conflicts, although appropriate when only accuracy in
adjudication is at stake, affords insufficient attention to the
entirely different state policies that support privilege rules. In
light of these shortcomings, courts and scholars became con-
vinced that sister state privilege rules merited closer considera-
tion.' 3
The Second Restatement was a reaction to the inflexible
approach of the First Restatement. Although it represents a vast
improvement, it too has its shortcomings. Not only does it fail
to consider the possibly independent interests of a deposition
state, but it provides a single rule for all privileges without recog-
nizing the different state policies that different privileges may
reflect. For these reasons, it is necessary to develop a more flex-
dentiality of the confessional. The more recent trend has been to protect
all confidential communications with clergymen of any denomination.
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975).
States also differ as to the status of a privilege after its holder has
died, see Comment, Posthumous Privilege in California, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 606 (1961), and in the definition of communication. Both of these
determinations directly affect the scope of any given privilege rule.
10. A horizontal choice of law question forces the court to select
one rule from among those of two or more states. A vertical question,
by contrast, requires a choice between a state rule and a federal rule.
See note 65 infra.
11. RESTATEMENT (FmsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597 (1934). See,
e.g., Doll v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 138 F. 705 (3d Cir. 1905);
Abety v. Abety, 10 N.J. Super. 287, 77 A.2d 291 (Ch. 1950).
12. FED. R. Evm. 102.
13. See R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); In re Queen, 233
N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962); RESTMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 139 (1971); Weinstein, Recognition in the United States
of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 COLum. L. Rsv. 535 (1956).
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ible approach that considers the policies underlying the existence
and form of the various privilege statutes.
The purpose of this Article is to provide the forum court
with guidelines for determining whether to admit testimony
about a communication at either the trial or the deposition stage
of a judicial proceeding. In order to solve this problem, it is
imperative to recognize that different privileges have different
purposes and that both these purposes and the stage of the pro-
ceedings at which the problem arises will determine what rules to
apply. In its deliberation, the court first must deal with any
justifiable reliance interest of the parties. Then, the court must
ascertain whether failure to honor a particular privilege claim
would undermine a fundamental policy of any state connected
with the controversy. Finally, the effect of a particular privilege
ruling on the workings of the interstate system,14 both as a whole
and in the specific case, must be considered. The analysis below
should help the forum court to recognize the various interests
involved and to decide whether to apply the forum's law, the
law of the state with the most significant relationship to the
transaction or occurrence at issue, or the law of the state in which
the deposition is to be taken.15
I. THE POLICY BASES OF TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES
A. GENERAL JusTFIcATIoNs
In the long history of privilege law, courts and legal scholars
have advanced a number of justifications for the recognition of
professional and personal privileges, 16 only three of which
14. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
15. Some cases described in this Article are used as illustra-
tions in both the trial situation and the deposition situation, because
similar issues may be raised regardless of the specific type of forum.
Thus, before deciding whether to order a deposition elsewhere, the forum
must consider its policy toward the privilege as well as that of the depo-
sition state. Similarly, before allowing a deposition to proceed over a
challenge, the court in the deposition state must make the same determi-
nations.
16. For instance, in the early 1600's, it was argued that the obliga-
tions of "honor among gentlemen" prevented professional men from tes-
tifying about communications with their clients. 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENcE§ 2286 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Lord Mansfield sounded the death
knell for this widely accepted rationale in a 1776 case involving the
physician-patient privilege, the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St.
Trials 355 (P. 1776):
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be surehe would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscre-
[Vol. 61:461
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retain any vitality today. First, a privilege may encourage free
and open communication within the confines of a specified
relationship. Second, a privilege may protect personal privacy
rights against intrusion by the judicial system. Finally, recogni-
tion of a privilege for attorney-client communications assures
fairness in the litigation process.
Some of society's most important relationships can be main-
tained satisfactorily only if there is full, frank, and entirely
truthful corhmuni6ation between the parties. A physician, for
example, cannot properly perform his duties if his patient does
not fully disclose the nature of his ailments, and an attorney
cannot effectively represent a client unless he is fully acquainted
with the facts of the client's case. Assurances of confidentiality
are often necessary to induce a free flow of information. 17
If the existence of a testimonial privilege will encourage open
communication and truthfulness, and if society will benefit more
from this increased communication than it would from the evi-
dence that would be available if no privilege existed, recognition
of a testimonial privilege on this "encouraging communications"
rationale is justified.1 8
Privileges also protect personal privacy by recognizing "a
right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain
narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or
supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdrop-
ping."19 Unlike the "encouraging communications" rationale, in
which a balance can be struck between the need to facilitate open
communications and the need for full disclosure of evidence, the
tion; but, to give that information in a court of justice, which
by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed
to him as any indiscretion whatever.
Id. at 573.
The marital privileges, by contrast, developed from the belief that
a wife, faced with a choice between loyalty to her husband and a duty
to tell the truth, was not likely to be a trustworthy witness. See Note,
Marital Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34 U. CH. L. RIv. 196, 198
(1966). As a result, spouses were absolutely disqualified from testifying
for or against each other. This disqualification was not definitively
eliminated in federal court until Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933).
17. See Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP
Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 Cox. B.J., 175, 178-79 (1962);
Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYxE L. REv. 175, 186-87 (1960).
18. For a more detailed exposition of this justification, see 8 Wicr-
MORE, supra note 16, § 2285 at 527-28.
19. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges
in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956).
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interests in conflict when a privacy rationale is asserted are
extremely difficult to balance.20  The effect on a confidential
relationship is not the prime factor to be weighed against the
need for evidence; rather, it is the individual's own interest in
informational control and personal privacy, the objective value of
which is often impossible to assess. Thus, the privacy justification
for privileges tends to take an absolute form, for it is difficult
to place the individual interest in personal privacy on the same
scale with the societal interest in just adjudication. 21
A third justification for recognition of a privilege applies
only to the attorney-client relationship. 2 2 Procedural fairness
in litigation may require recognition of some form of attorney-
client privilege. Even absent an interest in encouraging commu-
nication between lawyer and client, it would be unjust in an
adversary system to allow one party to force the opposing lawyer
to disclose damaging admissions made by his client.23  In
criminal cases, this problem reaches constitutional dimensions,
for failure to recognize a privilege could force a defendant
to choose between his right to effective counsel and his privilege
against self-incrimination. 24
20. With privileges that encourage communications, one can pur-
portedly weigh the effect of denying the privilege. The result is simply
less communication. With privacy-based privileges, the only effect is
that privacy has been violated, which is arguably bad in itself. Thus,
the decision whether or not to recognize such a privilege depends onjust how much privacy is worth, an absolute, as opposed to com-
parative, determination.
21. Perhaps the best judicial discussion of the privacy basis for
privileges appears in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (1970). In response to a psychiatrist's refusal to obey an order
directing him to answer questions, the California supreme court noted:
"We do not face the alternatives of enshrouding the patient's communi-
cation to the psychotherapist in the black veil of absolute privilege or
of exposing it to the white glare of absolute publicity. Our choice lies,
rather, in the grey area." Id. at 422, 467 P.2d at 561, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
833.
In this case, however, it was the psychiatrist who asserted that the
order unconstitutionally infringed both his personal privacy rights and
those of his patients. Although the court refused to honor his privilege
claim, the result might have been different had the patient asserted the
privilege on his own behalf.
22. Because this justification applies only to the attorney-client
privilege, it will be further discussed only in passing. See text accom-
panying note 112 infra.
23. Although this rationale does have the effect of encouraging com-
munication, one may not care at all whether a client talks to his lawyer
but may still believe that if he does talk, it is unfair to allow these
disclosures to be released to his opponent. These two rationales do, how-
ever, overlap to a certain extent. See text preceding note 17 supra.
24. If there were no attorney-client privilege, a defendant who ad-
[Vol. 61:461
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Not every privilege can be justified on each of the afore-
mentioned rationales. Unfortunately, very few of even the most
thoughtful works on the subject of privileges have examined this
problem.25 Yet, that each privilege may have a different raison
d'etre has important implications for choice of law decisions.
To the extent that different privileges protect fundamentally
different interests, it is inappropriate to treat them uniformly
for choice of law purposes.
26
mitted incriminating matters to his attorney would subject the informa-
tion to disclosure, and, in effect, incriminate himself. If, on the other
hand, the defendant chose not to disclose the information, he would, in
effect, relinquish his right to effective counsel.
Two scholars have urged that "[tfhe state should not be able to
abandon its duty to 'hunt up evidence' by virtue of the fact that the
accused exercised his constitutionally guaranteed right to consult an at-
torney." Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confi-
dences, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1963).
In recent years the Supreme Court has been unsympathetic towards
rules which force witnesses, and especially criminal defendants, to choose
between constitutional rights. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); cf. Note, Re-
solving Tensions Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Con-
current or Related Proceedings, 76 COLum. L. REV. 674 (1976).
Since the attorney-client privilege is universally recognized, at least
in some form, there has been no real need to rest the privilege on a
constitutional basis. The only serious problems that have arisen in this
context involve incriminating documents delivered by the client to his
attorney. In some cases, the courts refuse to allow privilege claims in
this situation, holding that no constitutional right is violated even if the
attorney in possession of the documents is permitted to assert neither
the attorney-client privilege nor the privilege against self-incrimination
on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d
451 (8th Cir. 1963). But see, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1963); In re House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
25. See C. DE WITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSI-
CIAN AND PATIENT (1958); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATY, CONFIDENTIALITY
AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS (1966); Krattenmaker, supra note 1
(general discussion); Louisell, supra note 19 (general discussion); Lou-
isell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 731 (1957); Louisell & Sinclair, Foreward: Reflections on the Law
of Privileged Communications: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Perspective, 59 CAL. L. REV. 30 (1971); Reese, Confidential Communica-
tions to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 55 (1963); Reutlinger, Policy, Pri-
vacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privileges, 61 CAL. L. REV.
1353 (1973); Sedler & Simeone, supra note 24; Note, The Husband-Wife
Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208 (1961);
Note, Marital Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 196
(1966); Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Work-
ers, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1050 (1973).
26. Modern conflicts analysis properly attaches great importance to
the interests protected by a given rule of law. The Second Restatement
19771
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B. PoLIcy BASES OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVILEGES
Some privilege rules can be justified only on an "encourag-
ing communications" theory. Others are defensible solely as
protections of privacy rights. Most privileges, however, fall
somewhere on a continuum between these two extremes, and
may be justifiable on both grounds-or on neither.
Recognition of the marital privileges is based almost entirely
on the importance of protecting privacy. In the words of
Professor Louisell, "[a] marriage without the right of complete
privacy would necessarily be an imperfect union. '27 Especially
since Griswold v. Connecticut,28 in which the Supreme Court
placed the marital relationship within a constitutionally pro-
tected "zone of privacy," the privacy rationale for marital privi-
leges appears exceedingly strong.
On the other hand, the argument that marital privileges
should be recognized because they encourage marital communica-
tion is very weak. Because a marital relationship is, or should be,
based on complete trust, the recognition of a testimonial privilege
is not necessary to assure free, confidential communication be-
tween husband and wife.29 Such communication will continue
lists "the relevant policies of. .. interested states and the relative inter-
ests of thosd states in the determination of the particular issue" as one
of the general factors to be considered in making choice of law decisions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (2) (c) (1971).
Most conflicts commentators, while disagreeing as to the best method
for resolving choice of law problems, agree that identification of "inter-
ests" protected by a given legal rule is an indispensable step in the proc-
ess. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, Tns CHOICE OF LAW PROCEss 99-102 et passim(1965); B. Cup=i, SEEcTED ESSAYS ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1963); R.
LEFLAR, AmmicAN CoNFrCrs LAw 249, 251-54 (1959); Reese, Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEbM. PROB. 679, 686
(1963).
27. Louisell, supra note 19, at 113.
28. 381U.S. 479 (1965).
29. There are, of course, two marital privileges-the marital com-
munications privilege and the privilege not to testify against a spouse.
See note 8 supra. As to the former, even its supporters admit that there
is little awareness of the privilege, and hence little reliance upon it. See
Reutlinger, supra note 25; Note, Marital Evidentiary Privileges in Minne-
sota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1952); Note, The Husband-Wife Privileges
of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 28 (1961). Even if the
privilege does not induce free communication, some argue that its abro-
gation might draw public attention and thereby inhibit communication.
Id. On reflection, however, it should be clear that the existence of a
testimonial privilege, in anything short of a police state atmospher% will
have no effect on free, confidential communication between husband and
wife.
The anti-spousal privilege only protects those married at the time
[Vol. 61:461
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whether or not there is a privilege.3 0
In the case of the attorney-client privilege, the arguments
are just the opposite. Most clients will disclose damaging
information to attorneys only after careful consideration. They
are likely first to think about the consequences of their words
and even to question the attorney if they have any doubts that
a communication may not be confidential. Those who have had
frequent contact with attorneys may be aware of a privilege and
rely on it as a matter of course.3 1 Given these factors, with-
drawal of the attorney-client privilege would almost certainly
inhibit free communication. Since open communication is essen-
tial to the satisfactory maintenance of the attorney-client rela-
tionship, courts should recognize that the privilege is based pri-
marily on this "encouraging communications" rationale.
The privacy basis for the attorney-client privilege, by
contrast, is quite weak. Few people are likely to treat an attor-
ney as a personal confidant as they would a spouse, a rela-
tive, a friend, or a clergyman. Most people do not maintain
ongoing relationships with lawyers; a client's interaction with an
attorney is very similar to that with other professionals and
business people, except that open communication is more impor-
tant to the maintenance of a satisfactory attorney-client relation-
testimony is sought. In some states only the witness spouse can claim
the privilege even if the other spouse had been the communicator. Since
these factors make it hard to claim a legitimate reliance interest, it is
difficult to maintain that the existence of the privilege has any effect
on marital communication.
30. Professor Louisell, a staunch supporter of privileges, has ad-
mitted that Wigmore's utilitarian "promotion of full disclosure" rationale
rests on a highly conjectural basis. Louisell, supra note 19, at 111.
31. Even an unsophisticated client could reasonably expect his at-
torney, who is an expert on the law, to stop him from making any dam-
aging admissions, if, in fact, any admissions to the attorney could be
damaging. Since the police, who are not acting directly in an accused
citizen's interest, are required to give a Miranda warning to those being
questioned, a fact known to all Americans who have ever watched a
police story on television, would it not seem incredible to the average
lay person that statements made to a lawyer, without such a warning,
could be used against the client's interests? For those citizens who are
unaware of the existence of the privilege, common sense and experience
suggest that disclosures can be freely made to an attorney. In this sense,
at least, people rely on the existence of the privilege.
This analysis in no way contradicts the author's disavowal of any
privacy basis for this privilege. See text preceding note 32 infra. Just
because clients recognize that legal problems can be freely discussed
with lawyers does not mean that these lawyers are being trusted as per-
sonal confidantes. Rather, clients talk freely to attorneys because they




ship. This suggests that the privilege be retained to encourage
free communication, but it certainly has little relevance to
a right to privacy. In fact, there is no greater privacy inter-
est in communications between attorney and client than there
is in confidential conversations between any two people. Extend-
ing a privilege to all confidential communications would cripple
the adjudicatory process,3 2 to the detriment of society's interest
in winnowing out the truth.
The remaining communication privileges fall somewhere on
the spectrum between the marital privileges and the attorney-
client privilege. Like the former, the clergyman-communicant
privilege is based on a strong personal bond of trust; it can be
sustained on the privacy rationale, but not necessarily on an
"encouraging communications" basis.33 The physician-patient
privilege may not be justified on either ground,3 4 while a
32. In addition to the loss of admissible evidence caused by such
a broad privilege, the court would have to spend an inordinate amount
of time determining whether or not a communication was meant to be
confidential.
33. The "encouraging communications" rationale for this privilege
is especially unpersuasive when the clergyman is a Catholic priest, be-
cause a parishioner will almost certainly know of the inviolability of
the seal of confession. If there were no privilege, and the Catholic peni-
tent were aware of that fact, he would be no less willing to confess
(except perhaps out of consideration for the potential future anguish of
the priest) because of his knowledge that the priest would not divulge
the contents of the confession under any circumstances.
The clergyman-communicant privilege raises several constitutional
questions. For instance, if a Catholic priest were required to testify
about communications made in confessional, both he and his communi-
cant might well claim a deprivation of the right to "free exercise" of
religion. On the other hand, a privilege limited to Catholic priests might
involve an "establishment" of religion within the meaning of the first
amendment. And even a broader clergyman-communicant privilege
might run afoul of the establishment clause if no similar privilege were
extended to other spiritual and moral advisers. For a discussion of these
problems, see Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the
Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29
U. Prrr. L. REV. 27 (1967).
Natural repugnance toward compelling a priest to violate his sacred
trust presents another rationale for recognizing this privilege. Even
Bentham, one of history's harshest critics of privilege doctrine, was
appalled at the thought of forcing priests to testify. He noted that
"[t]o all individuals of that profession, it would be an order to violate
what by them is numbered amongst the most sacred of religious duties."
4 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 588 (Bowring's ed. 1827),
cited in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2396 at 877. Since this argument
protects only the priest and provides no support for the right of the peni-
tent to prevent disclosure, however, it is of rather limited application.
34. In earlier times when persons with certain illnesses were likely
to be ostracized, the pressure to conceal the existence of a disease was
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privilege between psychotherapist and patient is probably valid
on both.3 5  The other professional privileges-those between
accountant and client and between journalist and source-rest
almost exclusively on the public policy of encouraging communi-
cations.3 6
great. Slovenko, supra note 17, at 178. This consideration is less impor-
tant in modern times and, since failure to communicate freely with
a doctor could result in continued illness or even death, the need to en-
courage such communication by a privilege rule is slight. Physical
diseases that are still accompanied by social stigma-for example, drug
addiction and venereal disease-present a more complex situation, but
do not necessarily suggest that a broad privilege to encourage communi-
cation is required.
Similarly, the doctor-patient relationship has become much less per-
sonal with the demise of the house call and the general practitioner,
and the increased cost of medical services. As a result, the claim for
a privacy-based privilege has become weaker, cf. Felber v. Foote, 321
F. Supp. 85, 88-89 (D. Conn. 1970), and many cases have begun to cut
back on the scope of the physician-patient privilege, see, e.g., Mathis
v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966); San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash. 2d
415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957).
35. People are still far more ashamed of mental ill health than of
physical ill health. See M. GUTTMAcHER & H. WEHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 269-87 (1952). Thus, fear of disclosure in court might
cause patients to be less candid with their therapists. This would not
only make treatment less effective, but might deter some people from
seeking psychiatric help altogether. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Pro-
fessions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L.
R.v. 609, 622 (1964). Moreover, the people most likely to be de-
terred will tend to be those with the most damaging admissions
to make-the very people who have the greatest need for help. Id. at
622-23. Clearly, a psychotherapist-patient privilege is justifiable on an
"encouraging communications" basis.
The privacy rationale for this privilege is equally compelling. In
a sense, psychotherapy itself is one of the most severe invasions of pri-
vacy imaginable, since it involves the deepest prying into both the con-
scious and the unconscious knowledge of the patient. Louisell, supra
note 25, at 745. The therapist may learn information about his patient
that the patient himself does not know and, often, does not want to know.
Therapists generally recognize the strong desire of most patients to main-
tain strict confidentiality, and, as a result, there is a particularly strong
ethic against disclosure among psychiatrists. Slovenko, supra note 17,
at 188-89.
Additionally, the nature of disclosures made during psychiatric ex-
aminations may make evidence obtained through testimony about these
disclosures both unreliable and highly prejudicial to the patient. SLO-
vENxo, supra note 25, at 187-88. Since patients may say things in ther-
apy that bear little or no relation to reality, forcing the therapist to dis-
close these communications would not help to provide reliable evidence.
This argument is unique to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and is
really an argument for incompetency of the witness rather than privilege.
36. The accountant-client relationship is even less justifiable on
a privacy basis than the attorney-client privilege. But see Couch v.
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Of course, each of the various American jurisdictions may
have its own justifications for recognizing certain privileges.
Some states may recognize them for reasons that appear out-
dated, or even irrational. Where a clear statement of the pur-
pose behind the privilege exists, however, such evidence of state
policy is quite important in resolving choice of law problems.
Unfortunately, the official state policy underlying a privilege is
rarely explained.3 7 As a result, the courts of one state will often
be forced to speculate as to the policy justifications for the privi-
leges of a sister state.38




Choice of law decisions, both generally and in regard to privi-
leges, necessarily involve a balancing process. The court must
weigh the benefits of having privileged communications admit-
ted as testimony against those of having the testimony excluded.
It is a primary thesis of this Article that because different
communications privileges have different policy foundations,
choosing the applicable law will, in many circumstances, depend
on the particular privilege.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 341 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Douglas argued that there is even a privacy aspect to this privi-
lege.
The reporter's privilege, where it is recognized, implements society's
desire to maintain a vigorous free press by promising otherwise reluctant
informants that their identities will remain confidential. Here, too, there
is little interest in personal privacy at stake, except the general desire
any individual may feel to control the use of information that he has
divulged.
Although the attempt to place the reporter's privilege on a constitu-
tional basis, derived from the first amendment, has failed, Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), this of course does not diminish the right
of a state to enforce such a privilege as a matter of legislative policy.
37. Unlike federal statutes, state laws rarely have any documented
legislative history. This is particularly true in the area of testimonial
privileges since many of the statutes are merely codifications of the com-
mon law.
38. This problem is not peculiar to the testimonial privilege sit-
uation, but exists whenever choice of law questions arise. For ex-
amples of courts struggling to identify the state policies underly-
ing substantive rules of law in a classic choice of law situation-the ap-
plicability of foreign automobile guest passenger statutes-see Tooker
v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Dym
v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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A. THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
When a choice of law question involves a claim of privilege
asserted at trial, the dispute normally centers on whether the
privilege law of the forum state, F, should apply or whether the
court should look to the state which has the most significant rela-
tionship with the communication, C.3 9 In a few situations the
law of another state may also be entitled to consideration.40
This section examines the competing considerations present in
the choice of law process.
1. The Interests of the Forum
The forum state has a legitimate interest in promoting ease
of administration in its courts. 41 By applying its own privilege
rules rather than those of a sister state, F eliminates the need
for its judges to familiarize themselves with a different ap-
proach.42 This is likely both to save time and to put the
decision on firmer ground.
In addition, the forum state has an interest in reaching just
results in domestic litigation.43 The reputation of F's judicial
39. The state of most significant relationship will almost always
be the state where the communication took place. The Second Restate-
ment adopted the "most significant relationship" terminology to cover
the rare cases in which the state of communication is entirely fortuitous.
Thus, if a married couple is domiciled in state X, and the wife com-
municates to the husband while both are spending a weekend in state
Y, X is the state of most significant relationship. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 139, Comment e (1971). If both
parties to a communication are domiciled in state A, but travel to state
B to communicate in reliance upon state B's privilege law, however, B,
not A, should be treated as the state of most significant relationship.
It should be noted that in the case of the anti-spousal privilege, be-
cause there is no communication, there can be no state of most significant
relationship to the communication. When this privilege is asserted, the
court will have to decide whether to apply forum law or the law of
the state with the most significant relationship to the married couple-
usually their domicile.
40. See note 52 & notes 108-11 infra and accompanying text.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
Comment a provides in part: "Enormous burdens are avoided when a
court applies its own rules, rather than the rules of another state, to
issues relating to judicial administration."
42. See LEFLAR, supra note 26, at 249-50. Of course, if promotion
of this interest were taken to its extreme, a court would never need
to apply foreign law. As Professor Leflar has said: "It has been argued
that a court should apply its own local law unless there is good reason
for not doing so. No one can deny the propriety of this argument so
long as the 'unless' clause is adequately emphasized." Id. at 250.




system may depend, in part, on the success with which the courts
uncover the facts of a given case. Thus, absent a compelling
reason for recognizing a privilege claim, the interest of F's courts
in admitting relevant testimony is entitled to weighty considera-
tion.
The judicial system must also protect the rights of its citizens
to privacy. When a forum recognizes a privilege because it
would be offensive to F's citizens for the judicial system to pry
into certain kinds of communications, F may be inclined to pro-
hibit testimony about the confidential matter, even if the
communications were originally made in a state that does not
recognize this testimonial privilege.
2. The Interests of the State of Most Significant Relationship
C often has an interest in assuring that its privileges are
honored in the courts of F. If C's policy is to encourage open
communication in certain protected relationships, C will not want
its policy diluted by the admissibility of the confidential mater-
ial in F's courts. Refusal by the courts of F to honor C's privi-
lege may deter free communication in C.
In addition, C's privacy-based privileges may be designed to
protect the sanctity of certain relationships within C. Thus, even
if F's non-recognition of C's privilege would not affect the be-
havior of C's citizens, C might have an interest in assuring that
certain communications made within its borders are protected
from any state intrusion."
When C recognizes no privilege, its interests in any privilege
decision made by F's courts is minimal. If C has an unusually
strong interest in achieving a just result in a particular litigation
in F's courts, C may want all relevant evidence admitted,45 but
44. For instance, suppose that in a court of F, testimony is sought
concerning marital communications made within C by citizens of C. C
may have an interest in protecting its citizens, who acted only within
C, from foreign invasions of privacy. C's interest, however, does not nec-
essarily depend upon the citizenship of the communicant. In the case
of a patient who crosses state lines to visit a psychiatrist, for example,
even if the privilege in the psychiatrist's state is based strictly on a pri-
vacy rationale, that state might have an interest in protecting the inviola-
bility of the relationship, whether or not the patient is a resident.
45. Assume, for example, a major stock market swindle in New
York. Suit is brought in New Jersey because that state is the only place
in which plaintiff can get personal jurisdiction over all the defendants.
Otherwise New Jersey is only a forum. New York recognizes no privi-
lege, while New Jersey does. Although it could be argued that New
York has no interest in the litigation, a plausible argument could be
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even in such a case, F's interest in assuring a just outcome is
likely to be greater than C's. If F has a strong interest in
suppressing privileged testimony in this situation, C's desire to
admit the evidence should be of little concern.
3. The Interests of the Communicating Parties
Whenever the parties to a particular communication have
relied on C's privilege, it would be unfair to compel disclosure
of the contents of the communication in a judicial proceeding
in F. Moreover, even when the parties do not specifically rely
on, or even know of, C's privilege, it may be inconsistent with
notions of federalism to ignore the reasonable expectations of
parties who act only within C that their communications will
be governed by C's legal standards.4 6 Thus, the parties to a com-
munication that is privileged where made often have a legitimate
interest in asserting the privilege in the courts of F.
47
4. The Interests of the Litigants
The litigants in the particular case have an interest in obtain-
ing a judicial decision based on a thorough knowledge of the
relevant facts.48 Recognition of a privilege, however, is based
in part on the belief that the need to protect the confidential-
ity of certain communications outweighs the importance of
hearing relevant testimony.49 Thus, the interests of the individ-
made that New York has some interest, however minimal, in the outcome
of the suit, and hence in the privilege determination.
46. Cf. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 28, 237 N.E.2d 877, 886, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734, 747 (1968) (Breitel, J., dissenting): "Justified expectations
are ... relevant in a[n] . . . intangible way: it is jurisprudentially sig-
nificant that parties' rights be determined by the law or system of rules
which they most probably believed would control their relationship."
The federal system in the United States is based on the territorial
sovereignty of the several states. Parties acting wholly within a state
will normally expect their actions to be governed by the laws of that
state. Absent competing considerations, comity requires that these ex-
pectations be honored. Cf. CAVERS, supra note 26, at 134-35.
47. Despite certain superficial similarities between the interests of
the state with the most significant relationship and those of the commu-
nicating parties, these are two distinct interests. The parties are not
bothered by the future effects in state C of the court's choice of law;
they are concerned about the effect on themselves in the instant
litigation.
48. Of course, in many instances, only one litigant will want
all the facts exposed in court; the other will want to see a privilege
claim upheld. While a litigant may have several reasons for claiming
a privilege, the desire to hinder the adjudicatory process is not a legiti-
mate one.
49. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
1977]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ual litigants are subordinate to the general public policy ex-
pressed in the privilege rules. 50 When failure to apply a privilege
would offend no public policy, however, fairness to the litigants
requires that the testimony be admitted.
5. Prevention of Forum Shopping
Choice of law rules should be designed, to the extent possible,
to prevent plaintiffs from choosing to sue in a particular state
merely because that state will apply a more favorable body of
law.51 Excessive forum shopping distorts the processes of the
interstate system, and may diminish public confidence in the
courts. Application of an arbitrary rule, such as "the law of the
state of communication governs," could eliminate all forum shop-
ping problems. Since such arbitrary rules ignore the other fac-
tors enumerated above, however, they create more inequities
than they eliminate. As in other choice of law determinations,
a court faced with conflicting privilege rules must sometimes
weigh the desire to discourage forum shopping against other im-
portant interests in deciding what law to apply.
B. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS
In almost every choice of law problem that arises at trial,
the forum court will have to choose between application of C's
privilege law and its own.5 2  In the preceding sections the
50. Most privilege statutes speak in absolute terms: no matter how
important the privileged information might be to accurate factfinding
in an individual case, the testimony cannot be admitted without the con-
sent of the holder of the privilege. On the other hand, a handful of
state statutes, especially those dealing with the physician-patient privi-
lege, give the courts discretion to admit the testimony when suppression
would defeat the ends of justice. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1969),
which prohibits disclosure of medical confidences "[p]rovided, that the
presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in
his opinion the same is necessary to proper administration of justice."
See also De Foe v. Duhl, 286 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1961); VA. CODE § 8-
289.1 (Supp. 1976).
When these equivocal privilege statutes are involved, the interests
of the litigants become more important in the choice of law process.
Since such statutes are rare, however, they will receive only this brief
mention.
51. The desire to prevent forum shopping applies to both the sub-
stantive law and the choice of law rules that the forum court will
follow.
52. There are a few instances, important only for their theoretical
interest, in which the law of another state might be significant. For
example, husband and wife, domiciliaries of state X, have an auto acci-
dent in X as a result of the husband's negligent driving. A month after
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rationales for the various communications privileges were dis-
cussed and the possible competing interests of different states
were identified. Specific choice of law problems that are likely
to arise will now be examined to determine which interests
should prevail in resolving the issues. Existing case law will be
discussed, but since most of the decisions in this area are remark-
ably unilluminating, an attempt will be made to develop a
rational system to provide guidance to courts in the future.
1. F recognizes the privilege; C does not
First, consider the case of a privilege designed to encourage
open communications. The F court may want to apply its privi-
lege because it is accustomed to applying the privilege in similar
situations in purely domestic litigation. On the other hand, the
desire to assure accurate fact-finding may favor receiving the tes-
timony, absent strong reasons for honoring the privilege. Here,
no public policy of F would prohibit admission of the testimony.
Since the privilege, by hypothesis, is based on an "encouraging
communications" rationale, and since F has little interest in en-
couraging communications in C,5 3 F has no stake in applying its
privilege.
Inasmuch as C does not recognize the privilege at all,
admission of the testimony would violate no public policy of that
state. Moreover, the parties themselves cannot claim that they
the accident, the couple moves to state C-F, where the husband confiden-
tially admits to his wife that he had been driving negligently at the
time of the accident. State C-F does not allow tort suits by one spouse
against the other but permits the marital communications privilege to
be waived by either spouse. State X allows tort suits between spouses
but requires the consent of both spouses to waive the marital communi-
cations privilege. Wife brings suit in C-F, and the C-F court, using its
own choice of law rules, must apply X law on the issues of negligence
and tort immunity. Which privilege rule should control?
If C-F uses its own privilege law in this situation, the wife may
be able to recover from her husband, although she would not be able
to do so if X's law were applied to all issues or if C-F's law were applied
across the board. This result is not necessarily bad, but if C-F and X
were each trying to discourage suits between spouses and were only us-
ing different means to achieve the same goal, it would be counterproduc-
tive to allow the wife to waive the privilege without her husband's con-
sent. For a general discussion of the problems inherent in using the
rules of one jurisdiction to govern some elements of a case and the rules
of another jurisdiction to govern others, see Reese, Depecage: A Com-
mon Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58 (1973).
53. As long as F's citizens are assured that communications made
in F will be accorded full protection from disclosure, failure to recognize
the privilege for communications made in C should not have any signifi-
cant deterrent effect on F's citizens.
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had any justifiable expectation of confidentiality, since communi-
cations made in C would normally be unprivileged. Thus, when
F recognizes a privilege designed to encourage communications,
and C does not, F should ignore its own privilege and admit the
testimony.
The Second Restatement would reach the same result in this
situation. Section 139(1) provides:
Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship with the communi-
cation will be admitted, even though it would be privileged
under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of such
evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum.54
Since admission of the communication in this hypothetical
situation would not violate any strong forum policy, the privilege
would not be honored. 55
Unfortunately, courts have not been particularly enlightened
in their approach to this problem.56 Instead, in many of the
older cases, the courts tended simply to parrot the position of
the First Restatement that the admissibility of evidence was to
be determined by the law of the forum.57 Levy v. Mutual Life
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
55. Id. § 139, Comment c, provides in part:
The evidence will not, however, be admitted in those rare in-
stances where its admission would be contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum. Such a situation may occasionally
arise when the state of the forum, although it is not the state
which has the most significant relationship with the communi-
cation, does have a substantial relationship to the parties and
the transaction and a real interest in the outcome of the case.
It is unclear from the comment when such a situation would occur, but
this exception is apparently meant to be a narrow one.
56. This is not surprising since, until very recently, the First Re-
statement was accepted in almost all jurisdictions. Some courts still ap-
ply the philosophy, if not the letter, of the First Restatement to
certain rules. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1955); Hare v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 953
(D. Md. 1971); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953). More-
over, the First Restatement's rule makes sense in a number of eviden-
tiary situations other than those involving privileges. See RESTATEMENT
(SEC D) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 138 (1971); note 113 infra.
57. See, e.g., Wexler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 889(N.Y. City Ct. 1942), a case in which the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy sought to prevent testimony by physicians about examination and
treatment, matters privileged under New York law, even though the in-
sured was a New Hampshire resident, and both the communications and
the contract were made in New Hampshire, whose privilege did not cover
the situation. Id. at 889. New York, the forum state, refused to permit
the insurance company to depose the physicians in question, noting that
"the public policy of this state does not permit the use of such evidence.
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Insurance Co.58 is perhaps the best example of the less dogmatic
approach that sometimes prevailed. In an action to recover on
a life insurance policy brought in New York, defendant moved for
an order directing that the testimony of physicians in Georgia
be taken. Both the communications and the insurance contract
in issue had been made in Georgia. Although the forum, New
York, recognized a physician-patient privilege, the court held that
Georgia law applied and denied the privilege claim. 59
There have been only two recent cases on this point. Hare
v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 0 a 1971 case involving the
attorney-client' and accountant-client privileges, began as a suit
for breach of contract, conspiracy to induce breach, and inten-
tionally inducing breach. While the action was pending in fed-
eral district court in Maryland, plaintiffs sought to compel
defendants to answer interrogatories in New York, the site of
the communications. New York did not recognize an accountant-
client privilege, but Maryland did. The trial court, in a rather
The admissibility of this evidence is determined by the law of the
forum." Id. at 890. See also Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
252 App. Div. 646, 300 N.Y.S. 721 (1937); In re Meyer's Estate, 206 Misc.
368, 132 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
58. 56 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The case is also discussed in
the text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
59. There were, in fact, a few complications in the case. The in-
sured had signed a contractual waiver of any physician-patient privilege
when she took out the policy. The court is less than clear whether it
granted the defendant's motion on the basis of this waiver or on the
broader ground of lack of privilege. Id. at 34. New York did not
at that time recognize contractual waiver of the physician-patient
privilege, but Georgia, the state whose contract law the court applied,
had no public policy opposing such a clause. Professor Weinstein found
the decision explicable on this narrow ground, Weinstein, supra note 13,
at 543 n.43, but it can also be read more broadly. In either event, the
result was correct.
60. 334 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1971).
61. Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court never
reached the question of the applicability of the asserted attorney-client
privilege. Defendants initially had moved to dismiss plaintiffs' com-
plaint on the ground, among others, that the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction. The court then granted plaintiffs leave to file interroga-
tories directed solely to the issue of jurisdiction. Defendants interposed
a number of objections, including the attorney-client and accountant-
client privileges, and plaintiffs moved to compel answers to the inter-
rogatories. 334 F. Supp. at 955. The court ordered the defendants to
answer some of the interrogatories but denied the motion for others that
did not deal solely with the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 960. Since the
interrogatories arguably involving privileged communications between
attorney and client were in this latter group, the court never had to
examine the relevant New York and Maryland statutes.
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confused opinion, 2 concluded that requiring disclosure would
violate Maryland's public policy and ruled against the plain-
tiffs. 63 This result was wholly unjustifiable because Maryland
had no legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
accountant-client communications made in New York. To the
contrary, Maryland's interests would have best been served by
admitting the evidence, thus improving the accuracy of the fact-
finding process. Since neither the parties nor New York had
any bona fide interest in suppressing the testimony, the court
should have ruled in the plaintiffs' favor.
The second case, Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co.,6
4
was decided in 1972 by the Fifth Circuit.6 5 The litigation took
place in Mississippi and arose from torts allegedly committed in
that state and Oklahoma by the Koehring Company, a Wisconsin
62. The judge noted the prediction of Hill v. Huddleston, 263 F.
Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1967), that the Maryland courts would have the
deposition court apply the law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the communication. 334 F. Supp. at 961. Then, however,
the judge concluded that the Maryland courts would not adopt the New
York rule in the instant case, although New York was clearly the state
with the most significant relationship to the communication. Id. at 961.
63. The court reasoned:
Comity between the states does not require the Maryland courts
to enforce a law or public policy of a sister state when such
action would violate the public policy of Maryland. The lan-
guage of the Maryland statute creating the accountant-client
privilege does not in terms apply only to communications made
in the state of Maryland or only to communications otherwise
having a significant relationship to Maryland; the language of
the statute, on the contrary, purports to speak in absolute terms
Id. (citations omitted).
This justification, which 'amounts to nothing more than appli-
cation of the discredited "plain meaning" rule, see, e.g., Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975),
is particularly bizarre in a choice of law case. Privilege statutes are
not written with choice of law problems in mind, and no inferences as
to the intent of the drafters can be drawn from the "absolute" language
of the Maryland statute.
64. 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. Federal cases present some problems that are beyond the scope
of this Article. First, the federal court must determine whether state
or federal privilege law should apply. For discussions of this problem,
see Louisell, supra note 19; Korn, supra note 1; Krattenmaker, supra
note 1; Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Drafts-
men of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1969). Only
when the court decides, as it did in Hyde Construction, that state law
should be applied, do the horizontal choice of law questions become sig-
nificant. Then, under the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the federal court must apply the conflicts rules
of the state in which it sits.
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corporation. Plaintiffs were contesting Koehring's claim that
Mississippi's attorney-client privilege protected certain docu-
ments from disclosure. They asserted that the Wisconsin privi-
lege law should control, since "Koehring's legal efforts were di-
rected by house counsel located in Wisconsin."66 The court, how-
ever, used a single "center of gravity"" test for both the substan-
tive and the privilege issues in the case and concluded that the
law of Mississippi, the center of gravity of the transactions,
should apply. The court's unwillingness to treat the privilege
issues separately led to an incorrect result.
Correct application of the Second Restatement test, as well
as proper evaluation of public policy interests, would have
required the court to apply the Wisconsin rules.6 8 Mississippi
might have been the center of gravity of the transactions, but
Wisconsin was clearly the state of most significant relationship to
the attorney-client communications. Precisely because Missis-
sippi was the center of gravity of the transactions, as well as
the forum state, it had a strong interest in disclosure of all rele-
vant information, and no Mississippi state policy would have been
offended by applying the less comprehensive Wisconsin rules to
the communications made in Wisconsin.
When the privilege in question is recognized in F as a
protection of privacy, the choice of law issues are somewhat
different. C's interest, if any, in the privilege decision is still
minimal. C has no stake in assuring accurate factfinding in the
litigation in F, and, whatever position F's courts take towards
the communications made in C, no state policy of C will be
offended, since C does not protect these communications. Simi-
larly, the parties to the communication can assert no justifiable
reliance interest; the privilege, by hypothesis, is not one on which
66. 455 F.2d at 341.
67. The court asserted that the law of the "forum with the greatest
interest in the controversy and in which the parties had the most signifi-
cant relationships concerning the occurrences giving rise to the litigation"
should control. Id. at 340. Since the Mississippi courts had adopted
the "center of gravity" test of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 175 (1971) in wrongful death actions, the federal court
concluded that the same approach would be extended to cases like Hyde
Construction. Id. at 341.
68. Curiously, the court never mentioned Restatement (Second)
§ 139, even while citing to Restatement (Second) § 175. The section
175 "center of gravity" approach was not designed to apply to privilege
questions, and section 139 would compel an opposite result on the facts
of this case. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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people are likely to rely,69 and the absence of any privilege in
C makes the possibility of reliance even more remote.
On the other hand, when F's privilege is designed to protect
privacy rights rather than to encourage communications, F has
good reason to enforce its own privilege. If F has a state policy
against intruding upon the privacy of certain relationships, com-
pelling disclosure of communications made within the scope of
those relationships violates that policy even if the communica-
tions were made out-of-state. If F's citizens are repulsed at the
thought of forcing a husband to testify about communications
made to him by his wife, that repulsion will be equally great
whether the communications took place in C or in F.
Not all privacy-based privileges, however, are so strongly
rooted. For instance, if F recognizes a privilege in civil cases
only,70 the argument that F's public policy forbids intrusion on
the parties' privacy founders. Rather, F's rule indicates that in-
trusion is sometimes permissible. When the policy behind F's
protection of privacy is weak, and the privilege is recognized only
in limited circumstances even in domestic litigation,7 1 F's interest
in applying its privilege to a communication made in C is less
compelling.
One other consideration looms in the background: the possi-
bility of increased forum shopping if F applies its privilege even
though it would not be honored were the litigation in C rather
than F. When F is selected as the forum solely because of
its privilege rules and has no substantial relationship to the sub-
ject matter of the litigation, the party seeking to compel disclo-
sure may be unfairly prejudiced if the F court refuses to admit
the privileged information and decides the case without the bene-
fit of the disputed testimony.72
69. See note 29 supra and accompanying text; note 33 supra.
70. Several states recognize the physician-patient privilege in civil
cases only. See, e.g., MoNT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 93-701-4(4) (1964).
71. Aside from the privileges that are recognized only in civil liti-
gation, a state may sometimes approve broad waiver provisions for a
particular privilege, see note 9 supra, or qualify the privilege, see
note 50 supra. Other evidence that the privilege does not reflect
a strong state policy may also be available, such as its limitation to cer-
tain kinds of conduct or certain types of proceedings, or judicial decisions
indicating that the privilege has been treated lightly.
72. It should be noted that this conclusion follows only because Fis solely a forum. Were F the home of the plaintiff or the defendant,
the results might be different because then F would have some legitimate
interests in protecting the privacy rights of its citizens. See text preced-
ing note 70 supra. See also note 74 infra.
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Nevertheless, even in this case, unless F's public policy is
very weak, sufficient justification for applying the privilege
exists. Perhaps the best solution, which would enable F's court
both to honor its own state public policy and to avoid undue
prejudice to the litigants, would be to dismiss the case on forum
non conveniens grounds, or otherwise close the doors to litiga-
tion. 73  Of course, if F has significant contacts with the substan-
tive issues in the case, it should not hesitate to both apply its
own privilege and continue to hear the case.
74
73. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to decline
to hear a case, even when all the formal requisites of jurisdiction exist.
The court has discretion to dismiss the case when, for one reason or
another, the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient. In Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the leading case on the issue, Justice
Jackson characterized the "availability of compulsory process for attend-
ance of unwilling ... witnesses" as an important consideration in decid-
ing whether to apply the doctrine to a particular case. Id. at 508. An
analogous situation exists when a witness can be compelled to attend,
but not to testify. Thus, if F's public policy makes it impossible to com-
pel a witness to testify in a court of state F, but if the witness could
testify in the courts of another state, the F court would be justified in
dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds. This is especially true
when F has no significant contacts with the subject matter of the case.
If an F court decides not to dismiss under the forum non conveniens
doctrine, it might still close its court to the case on public policy grounds.
If the suit were brought in F solely to take advantage of F's privilege
law, the court could dismiss it to prevent use of F's judicial system to
hinder the pursuit of justice. Although "public policy" is most often
the justification for closing the doors of the judicial system when plain-
tiff's claim is repugnant to the forum's policy, the forum should also
be able to close its doors when the plaintiff's motives are clearly im-
proper. See generally Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict
of Laws, 56 COLUm. L. Rnv. 969 (1956).
When either forum non conveniens or "public policy" in this door-
closing sense is the court's rationale for dismissing a case pending in F,
the plaintiff is still free to sue in C or some other state. If obtaining
jurisdiction in another state is a problem, the F court can condition its
dismissal on the defendant's consent to suit in another state. See, e.g.,
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 717, 244 N.E.2d 56,
296 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1968). Since plaintiff is free to sue elsewhere, dismis-
sal does not prejudice any of his substantive rights, assuming the statute
of limitations has not run; it only prevents him from unfairly taking
advantage of F's privilege rules.
While dismissal is an appropriate remedy when the privilege prob-
lem becomes apparent prior to the trial, it is less desirable after the
trial has already started. The defense attorney should know which wit-
nesses can assert a privilege claim before trial, however, and the issue
can generally be resolved at that time.
74. F should not have to compromise its interest in protecting pri-
vacy rights. At the same time, if F has a significant relationship with
the substantive issues in the case, F is an appropriate forum. Although
a litigant may suffer some prejudice in this situation, there is always
a potential for prejudice when relevant testimony is suppressed by appli-
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The Second Restatement's formulation 5 supports this posi-
tion. When a "strong public policy" of the forum dictates
exclusion of the allegedly privileged material, the Restatement
calls for enforcement of the forum's privilege.76 Not surpris-
ingly, considering the relatively recent emergence of the privacy
justification for privileges,77 there is no case law on this point.
This lack of precedent should allow the courts to make an en-
lightened start in the area.
Determining the rationale for the privilege at issue, then, is
extremely important whenever F recognizes a privilege and C
does not. If the privilege is designed to encourage communica-
tions, F should ignore its own precedents and admit the evidence;
if the justification is based on protection of personal privacy
rights, unless F's policy is weak, F should honor its privilege.
2. C recognizes a privilege; F does not
Where C has a privilege designed to encourage communica-
tions, C has a salient interest in insuring its recognition, and fail-
ure of F to do so could seriously hamper C's efforts to encourage
communication within the state. C's citizens are likely to com-
municate less freely if they know that confidentiality does not
extend to out-of-state judicial proceedings. 78 Moreover, depend-
cation of a privilege statute. The litigant's interest must be subordinated
to stronger public policy considerations. See text accompanying notes
48-50 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
76. RESTATEmnNT (SEcoND) OF CONFLiCT OF LAWS § 139, Comment
c (1971), says, in part:
[T]he state of the forum might consider a given privilege, as
that of priest and penitent, sacrosanct and therefore not permitintroduction of the evidence even though the state of the forum
has no relationship to the transaction and the privilege was not
recognized in the state of most significant relationship.
From the comment it is apparent that this situation would arise very
infrequently, but the rule should logically apply whenever a privilege
is based on a strong policy of protecting privacy rights.
77. It is hard to date exactly when the privacy basis was first recog-
nized. Some of Professor Louisell's early articles were influential in gen-
erating acceptance of the rationale, e.g., Louisell, supra note 19. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), also provided some impetus.
78. It should be noted, however, that even some communications
protected by the law of the state of most significant relationship may
not be absolutely sacrosanct within C. For instance, in federal criminal
proceedings it is settled law, although arguably bad policy, that federal
privilege rules govern. United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Krol, 374 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 835 (1967). In civil cases in federal court, the Federal Rules
of Evidence resolved the split in case authority by deciding that privilege
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ing on the circumstances surrounding the communication,79 the
parties may have a reliance interest or, even absent specific reli-
ance, they may generally expect that C's law will apply. F's
interest is largely one of assuring accurate factfinding. By not
applying C's privilege, the courts of F would be able to gather
additional evidence on which to judge the merits of the case.
When F is little more than a naked forum, balancing these
competing interests is relatively simple. C may have as high a
a stake in assuring accurate factfinding as F itself, but it has
decided to subordinate this interest to its policy of encouraging
communications within its boundaries. Because F's interests are
minimal, its courts should defer to C's public policy. A contrary
result would encourage forum shopping, since the privilege
would clearly be honored if the case were adjudicated in C.
C's privilege should be respected even if F has substantial
contacts with the transactions underlying the litigation. It is
true that F's interest in assuring accurate adjudication looms
somewhat larger in this situation, but the expectation interest
of the communicating parties remains important. Further, the
long-term effect of ignoring C's privilege would seriously hamper
C's ability to promote its policy of encouraging open communica-
tion. Even when weighed against the inconvenience of inaccu-
rate factfinding and the difficulty of applying foreign laws to
the case at hand, C's interests are clearly stronger. Moreover,
forum shopping would remain a problem if F were to ignore C's
privilege.8 0
The Second Restatement approach to this situatioi insuffi-
ciently respects the interests of both the state of most significant
relationship and the parties to the communication. The Restate-
ment would admit the evidence "unless there is some special
reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be
claims asserted with respect to federal elements of any claim or defense
are controlled by federal law. FaD. R. EvID. 501. Thus, if a particular
privilege is recognized by C, but not by federal law, the confidentiality
of communicating parties is not completely protected.
79. For instance, if an accountant and his client confer in C, the
client might well make disclosures only because he knows of C's privi-
lege. In such a situation, the client would have a significant reliance
interest.
80. When C is also the forum state, it will certainly apply its own
privilege, even if it has no significant relationship to the substantive is-




given effect."81 The comment to section 139 indicates that reli-
ance on C's privilege is a consideration that might justify applica-
tion of the privilege. The concept of reliance is a very broad
one, perhaps broad enough to include all communications made
in the scope of relationships protected on an "encouraging
communications" rationale.8 2 But the Restatement treats reliance,
as only one factor to be weighed in the ultimate decision, and
not as determinative.
8 3
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(2) (1971)
provides:
Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship with the communica-
tion but which is not privileged under the local law of the forum
will be admitted unless there is some special reason why the
forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.
82. Id. § 139, Comment d, provides, in part:
The forum will be more inclined to give effect to a privilege
if it was probably relied upon by the parties. Such reliance
may be found if at the time of the communication the parties
were aware of the existence of the privilege in the local law
of the state of most significant relationship. Such reliance may
also be found if the parties, although unaware of the existence
of the privilege, made the communication in reliance on the fact
that communications of the sort involved are treated in strict
confidence in the state of most significant relationship. In this
latter situation, the fact that the communication was of a sort
treated in strict confidence in the state of most significant rela-
tionship was presumably a result of the existence of the privi-
lege. Hence, in a real sense the parties could be said to have
relied upon the privilege although ignorant of it.
The last three sentences quoted indicate that even a general expecta-
tion that the law of a particular state will govern may be enough to
justify application of that state's law. See text accompanying notes 46
& 79 supra.
83. Comment d enumerates four factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether to admit the evidence:
(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state of the
forum has with the parties and with the transaction involved,
(2) the relative materiality of the evidence that is sought to
be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved, and (4) fairness
to the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139, Comment d (1971).
Reliance and expectation interests are subsumed in factor (4). In
considering factor (1), the interests of C and the need to discourage
forum shopping, taken together, should prevail, even if the forum has
numerous contacts with the parties and the transaction. See text pre-
ceding note 80 supra.
Materiality of the evidence should not be a significant consideration
unless C itself recognizes only a qualified privilege. See note 50 supra.
Once C has decided that its citizens are entitled to communicate without
fear of disclosure, F should honor that decision, no matter how signifi-
cant the need for disclosure. Moreover, judging admissibility by the
"importance" or materiality of the communication would seriously im-
pair C's policies, for important information is precisely what C's citizens
are most interested in protecting. A privilege is worth little if it only
applies to unimportant matters.
Finally, the Restatement position would accord more respect to a for-
[Vol. 61:461
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES
The leading early case on this point was Doll v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States,84 an action on a life
insurance policy originally brought in a New Jersey state court
and then removed by defendant to federal court. Defendant
sought testimony from a physician who had treated a sister of
the deceased in New York about his communications with her
in order to show that the deceased had misrepresented his family
medical history in an insurance application. The doctor asserted
the New York physician-patient privilege, but the court denied
the privilege claim, on the ground that the law of the forum
controlled.85  The court's decision cannot be justified. Assum-
ing that the New York privilege was based on an "encourag-
ing communications"8 6 rationale, the reliance interest of the
patient, combined with New York's interest in safeguarding the
confidentiality of physician-patient communications within the
state, were sufficient to require recognition of the New York
privilege.
A similarly undesirable result was reached in Abety v.
Abety.8 7 Defendant, seeking to have his marriage annulled be-
cause his wife had failed to inform him of her sterility, wanted
access to records from a New York hospital which dated from a
period when both parties resided in that state. The couple had
since moved to New Jersey, the site of the instant action. The
New Jersey court held that on a deposition to be taken in New
York, defendant was entitled to obtain hospital records made in
that state, despite the fact that such records were privileged in
New York. As in Doll, the court was content to rest on the ill-
eign privilege that is widely recognized or similar to a privilege recog-
nized in the forum than to a relatively novel privilege. This bias against
nonconformity is unjustified. F should not be free to ignore a strong
policy decision of C, simply because C is the only state to have taken
such a position. A common rule of law is not necessarily the better one.
84. 138 F. 705 (3d Cir. 1905).
85. The court repeated the old dogma that "[tJhe prohibition of
the New York statute is a rule as to evidence or procedure .... The
rule affects the remedy and not the contract. In such cases, the law
of the forum, and not of the place of the contract, must govern." Id.
at 710.
86. Since the privacy justification for privileges was not developed
until well after Doll was decided, it can reasonably be inferred that New
York's physician-patient privilege rested on an "encouraging communi-
cations" rationale. Although, as a matter of abstract general policy, this
privilege may be unjustifiable on any ground, see note 34 supra, the
New York legislature's decision to recognize the privilege should be re-
spected by the courts of other states.
87. 10 N.J. Super. 287, 77 A.2d 291 (Ch. 1950). See Weinstein, supra
note 13, at 540.
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considered rule that the law of the forum must govern the ad-
missibility of evidence.88
There are a few more recent cases that consider whether
C's privilege should be respected in F when F does not recognize
such a privilege. All these cases involve the marital privileges.8 9
Since those privileges are probably best justified on a privacy
basis,90 the cases will not be discussed until after consideration of
the appropriate treatment of privacy-based privileges not recog-
nized by the forum state.9 1
C's interest in enforcing its privacy-based privilege is not as
great as its interest in enforcing a privilege based on encourag-
ing communications. If C's reasons for respecting the privilege
do not reflect a desire to encourage free and open communication,
the possibility that F's failure to recognize it may discourage such
communication will be of little concern to C. Instead, in most
circumstances, 92 C will have no interest other than its desire to
assure the inviolability of certain relationships within its borders.
Failure to recognize C's privilege in a few out-of-state actions
is not likely to seriously frustrate the purposes of C's statute,
since confidentiality will not be invaded within C's borders.
Moreover, since recognition of privacy-based privileges has
no effect on primary behavior,9 3 the parties to the communica-
tion have a weak claim of reliance. Thus, in most circum-
stances where C recognizes a privacy-based privilege and F does
not, there is little cause for F to honor C's privilege.9 4
88. The court cited Wexler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d
889 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942), see note 57 supra, and wrote: "The cloak of
privilege thrown about the witnesses called by defendant to give testi-
mony in New York cannot deprive the defendant of the right to the
benefit and use of that evidence." 10 N.J. Super. at 289, 77 A.2d at
292.
The court also failed to consider whether the New York courts would
allow such a deposition to be taken, given that state's public policy
against disclosure of such information. For a more detailed discussion
of this problem, which is very important in cases involving depositions,
see notes 119-20 & 167-68 infra and accompanying text.
89. R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
People v. Carter, 34 Cal. App. 3d 748, 110 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied sub nom. Carter v. California, 419 U.S. 846 (1974).
90. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
92. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
93. If people do not rely on privacy-based privileges, the existence
or non-existence of the privilege will not alter any behavioral patterns.
But cf. note 46 supra.
94. Failure of F to recognize C's privilege may, however, lead to
forum shopping. Nevertheless, the reasons for admitting the testimony
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The Second Restatement opposes recognition of C's privilege
in F when the privilege is based on a privacy rationale. A
comment to section 139, however, suggests that when the forum's
interest in the parties and the substance of the litigation is rela-
tively small, deference to the privilege of the state of most sig-
nificant relationship might be appropriate.9 5 This is a wise
conclusion; as C's interests in fairness to the parties and the out-
come of the litigation increase, C's privilege is entitled to greater
weight.96
The only two important cases on this issue have arisen
relatively recently. In R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass,97 a plaintiff sought
to depose the wife of defendant Bass, a resident of Pennsylvania.
The main action was pending in federal court in Georgia.
Pennsylvania had both a spousal communications privilege and
an absolute ban on anti-spousal testimony, while Georgia had
only a communications privilege. The court concluded that even
though Georgia law was controlling in the main action, the Geor-
gia courts would probably honor the Pennsylvania privilege
are sufficiently persuasive to outweigh the forum shopping objection.
See note 74 supra for a similar outcome on slightly different facts.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139, Comment
d (1971), says, in part:
Among the factors that the forum will consider in determining
whether or not to admit the evidence are (1) the number and
nature of the contacts that the state of the forum has with the
parties and with the transaction involved .... If the contacts
with the state of the forum are numerous and important, the
forum will be more reluctant to give effect to the foreign privi-
lege and to exclude the evidence than it would be in a case
where the contacts are few and insignificant. In the latter sit-
uation, the forum may feel that the interest of the state of most
significant relationship in having the evidence excluded should
prevail.
In the case of a privilege designed to encourage open communication,
C's great interest in seeing its privilege recognized should always out-
weigh F's desire to admit the testimony. Therefore, for such privileges,
this section of the comment is ill-founded. See note 82 supra. When
a privacy-based privilege is involved, however, C's interests are some-
what less significant, and the substantiality of F's contacts with the par-
ties and the transaction assumes greater importance.
96. For example, suppose Smith sues Jones in F for breach of a
contract made and scheduled to be performed in C. In his home state,
C, Smith has confessed to his wife that he had failed to comply with
one of the terms of the contract. F regards this term as imposing an
absolute duty on Smith; C interprets it to be only a condition precedent
to further performance by Jones. C recognizes a marital communications
privilege; F does not. Assuming that C's law is to apply on the contract,
and that C considers protection of the privacy of the marital relationship
more important than accurately resolving the contract dispute, F should
have little reason to upset C's policy determination.
97. 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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rule.98 Although this result is contrary to the doctrine outlined
above, it is correct on other grounds, involving the role of
Pennsylvania as the deposition state.90 The forum court, antici-
pating that Pennsylvania would not allow the deposition to pro-
ceed because of its strong public policy against invading marital
privacy, rightly deferred to Pennsylvania's privilege both to
maintain respect for the judicial system and to ensure the avail-
ability of deposition information. 10 0
In the other recent case, People v. Carter,10 defendant
appealed a murder conviction on the ground that the California
trial court had improperly admitted testimony about communica-
tions made by defendant to his wife. The facts in the case were
somewhat bizarre, 10 2 but the privilege problem arose because
the communications were made in Illinois, while the murder was
committed in California. Carter asserted that the communica-
tion was privileged under Illinois law, but the court summarily
dismissed the contention that Illinois privilege law should
apply. 0 38 Despite the court's unwillingness or inability to articu-
98. The court further concluded, however, that, in the instant case,
the Pennsylvania fraud exception to the anti-spousal privilege would
probably apply. Accordingly, it allowed the deposition to proceed but
held that the communications privilege should still be honored. Id. at
763.
99. See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
100. The court clearly feared that Pennsylvania's courts would rule
that the anti-spousal privilege would protect the communication sought,
and it was not convinced that the Pennsylvania courts should allow such
testimony to be taken on deposition within the state:
The Pennsylvania competency statute does not merely establish
a rule of evidence; rather it announces a deeply ingrained public
policy of that state; and while ordinarily a deposition state
would defer to the forum state on a question of evidence, it is
not required to do so (and probably would not) where its public
policy would be offended thereby.
295 F. Supp. at 761.
101. 34 Cal. App. 3d 748, 110 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Carter v. California, 419 U.S. 846 (1974).
102. Defendant was on probation in California from a conviction for
receiving stolen property. He obtained permission to travel to Arkansas,
but on the way he made an unauthorized stop to see his wife in Chicago.
When he found out that deceased and deceased's daughter had helped
his wife get to Chicago, he became angry, assaulted his wife, and told
her "I'm going to kill them all." Then he went back to Los Angeles,
where he allegedly killed the deceased. Id. at 750-51, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
325-26.
103. The court said that "[w]hile the communication was made in
Chicago, the question of privilege is determined by reference to the law
of California." Id. at 752, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 327. No further explanation
was provided, although the court did note that defendant could not have
expected confidentiality because in Illinois the privilege would not have
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late a reason for its conclusion, the result was clearly correct.
Illinois had no interest in encouraging marital communications in
this case-defendant had at best a minimal connection with Illi-
nois, and the marital privileges cannot rest on an "encouraging
communications" rationale. 04 Furthermore, Illinois's interest
in protecting privacy had to be subordinated in this case to the
interest of California, which was the forum, the state with the
closest connection to the parties, 0 5 and the state whose substan-
tive criminal law was being applied.10 6
When C honors a privilege that F does not recognize, then,
as in the converse situation, the forum court must consider the
policy basis of the privilege to determine whether testimony
should be compelled in the case before it. If the privilege rests
on an "encouraging communications" rationale, C's privilege
should always be honored. If the justification rests on a desire
to protect personal privacy, the privilege should only be honored
when C has more significant contacts with the parties and the
subject matter of the litigation than does F. The results under
the Second Restatement rule will be correct in most instances;
but because it fails to analyze the policies underlying the vari-
ous privileges and stresses instead factors which are less relevant
to the determination, 10 7 the Restatement provides the courts with
only partial, and sometimes confused, advice as to the proper
privilege law to apply.
3. Some final comments on privilege claims asserted at trial.
Although choice of law questions about privilege claims
almost always involve disputes over whether to apply the law
been available to Carter in a prosecution for assault on his wife. Id.
at 753, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
104. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
105. It could be argued that California, rather than Illinois, was the
state with the most significant relationship to the communication. But
since the wife was apparently staying in Chicago at the time of the com-
munication and Carter traveled to Illinois specifically to see her, Illinois
was probably the state of most significant relationship. In any event,
the court was correct in applying California law.
106. In most circumstances, the source of the law governing substan-
tive issues in the case will not be relevant to the choice of law determi-
nation. When the forum's substantive law is not being applied, however,
there may be even less reason for the forum not to honor the privileges
of another state. See note 95 supra. The source of the substantive law
may also be important in deciding whether use of the depecage doctrine
is appropriate. See note 52 & notes 76-79 supra and accompanying
text.
107. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
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of F or the law of C, there have been cases in which one party
asserts that the interests of a third state, generally one whose
substantive law governs most elements of the cause of action,
require the forum court to apply that state's privilege law.108
The fact that a particular state's law governs most substantive
elements of the case, however, is no reason to respect its privilege
law.10 9 Early cases dealing with this issue reached the correct
result on this point," 0 although perhaps on an incorrect ration-
ale. Only if a privilege rule is so closely related to the particular
substantive law being applied that separation of the two would
be grossly unjust, should the court feel compelled to apply them
as a unit."'
The preceding discussion of privilege claims asserted at trial
has centered on privileges justified either as a means of promot-
ing free and open communication or as a way to protect personal
privacy. Most communications privileges are based on one or
both of these rationales, but states might recognize certain privi-
leges on other grounds. For instance, a state might justify an
attorney-client privilege solely on the ground that procedural
fairness during litigation requires it.112 If this were the ration-
108. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Long, 186 Ark. 320,
53 S.W.2d 433 (1932); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan.
146, 96 P. 62 (1908).
109. The doctrine of depecage allows a court to apply rules emanat-
ing from different jurisdictions to different segments of a single case.
For a general discussion of depecage, see Reese, supra note 52.
110. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Long, 186 Ark. 320, 53
S.W.2d 433 (1932), involved a suit over an Ohio insurance contract in
which plaintiff sought admission of testimony consisting of communica-
tions with a physician. Both the communications and the trial occurred
in Arkansas, and the court applied the old rule that the law of the forum
must govern in determining admissibility of evidence. Id. at 330, 53 S.W.
2d at 437. In this case, the old rule yielded the correct result.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan. 146, 96 P. 62 (1908),
involved litigation over the validity of a clause waiving the physician-
patient privilege which had been inserted in a New York life insurance
contract. New York did not recognize contractual waiver, while Kansas,
the forum and the state where the communication took place, did.
The court, in a confused opinion, first asserted that since both state
statutes contemplated the possibility that the patient could waive the
privilege by consent, the only question was the procedural one of how
that consent could be expressed. Id. at 154-55, 96 P. at 65. The court
then concluded that Kansas procedure would be followed and the waiver
recognized. After labeling this a procedural matter, however, the court
commented that the patient would be deprived of a valuable right if
contractual waiver in advance of litigation were not allowed. Id. at 155,
96 P. at 66. These two positions are somewhat contradictory.
111. See note 52 supra.
112. See text preceding note 24 supra.
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ale, the forum state would always be justified in recognizing its
own privilege, and never in recognizing the privileges of C, since,
within constitutional limitations, each state should be able to set
its own standards to assure fairness in litigation." 3
One remaining problem is that a single privilege may be
justified on more than one policy ground. A court faced with
a choice of law decision concerning the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, for example, might determine that this privilege is
based both on protecting privacy and on encouraging communica-
tions." 4 The methodology outlined in the preceding sections ne-
cessitates different results depending on the underlying policy
bases. It is perhaps self-evident, however, that there is no reason
to deny application of the privilege where it would be recognized
on one ground but not the other. In this situation the court
should always resolve the conflict in favor of applying the privi-
lege.
III. PRIVILEGES CLAIMED TO PRECLUDE EXAMINA-
TION OF WITNESSES OR DOCUMENTS OUTSIDE
THE FORUM STATE
A. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
When a litigant seeks to take depositions in another state,
the situation becomes more complicated. Choice of law questions
about whether to permit depositions tend to arise in two differ-
ent situations. First, a party may seek permission in the forum
state to depose a witness or to obtain records in another
state." 5 The forum court may feel obligated to limit the scope
of testimony by ruling that the confidentiality of certain privi-
leged matters should not be violated. Alternatively, the claim
of privilege may be asserted in the deposition state itself, and
the party who seeks the testimony may apply for an order com-
pelling the witness to testify, forcing the courts in the deposition
113. If, on the other hand, C recognized a privilege on this basis
and F did not, F should still be able to follow its own policy. In this
situation the First Restatement approach makes sense because this is
similar to a procedural rule that the law of the forum should govern.
114. To make this determination, the court should first examine leg-
islative history and intent. In many cases, if not most, however, these
sources are unilluminating, and the court will be forced to find a state
policy from the words of the existing statutes and judicial opinions or
lack thereof.
115. See, e.g., Hare v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 334 F. Supp.
953 (D. Md. 1971); R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D.
Ga. 1968); Levy v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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state to make a determination on the privilege issue.110 In either
situation, the court must weigh the interests of the parties to
the communication, of the litigants, and of the two or more states
involved.
The Second Restatement does not mention the deposition
situation in either the text of section 139 or the comment.
Rather, the Restatement relegates the discussion of depositions
to one paragraph in the Reporter's Note,117 which recommends
that the privilege law of the deposition state apply only when
that state is also the state of most significant relationship. The
deposition problem, however, deserves more complete treatment.
The interests of the communicating parties and of C, which
have been detailed in the previous discussion of privileges as-
serted at trial,"18 do not change merely because the question
arises on deposition. F's interests, however, are somewhat differ-
ent. The actual choice of law decision may be made by the courts
of the deposition state, D, in which case F's interest in the ad-
ministrative ease of applying its own law is irrelevant. When
a court of F is determining what privilege law to apply at deposi-
tion, there are also good reasons to recognize D's privileges. If
D would not permit certain testimony to be taken, there is little
point in insisting that F recognizes no privilege."19 This position
would not assist F in procuring the desired testimony; indeed,
if F's decision is little more than an empty gesture, it could de-
crease respect for F's courts and the judicial system in general. 20
When depositions are involved, D's interests in recognizing its
own privilege must also be considered. When D's courts are to
116. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551(2d Cir. 1967); In re Walsh, 243 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1963); In re
Queen, 233 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
117. After discussing the general problems of choice of law involving
privileges, the Note simply says:
An analogous problem may arise when a deposition is
sought to be taken in a state other than the state of trial To
date, the courts of the deposition state have refused to admit
evidence of a communication privileged under their local law,
but it would appear that in all of these cases the deposition state
was also the state of most significant relationship with the com-
munication. [citations omitted].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139, Reporter's Note
(1971).
118. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
119. See R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758, 761 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
120. D's refusal to abide by F's decision on the privilege question
might create full faith and credit problems. See Comment, Privileged
Communications Under Rule 26(b): Conflict of Laws in Diversity Cases,
23 U. CHI. L. REv. 704, 716-18 (1956).
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determine whether to honor the privilege, ease of administration
would support a decision by D to apply its own privilege law. But
even when F's courts decide whether to allow the depositions,
D retains an interest in assuring that no deposition taken within
its borders violates a strong state policy. Thus, if D recognizes
a privilege on the ground that certain relationships are sacro-
sanct and should be protected from intrusion, D might be justi-
fied in refusing to allow a deposition that would violate confi-
dences made within the scope of those relationships.
The following discussion of the resolution of choice of law
problems involving depositions will focus only on situations in
which F's policy conflicts with D's.121 Where F and D have uni-
form policies on the issue in question, problems should be
resolved within the framework of the previous discussion, since
F and D in combination have the same interests in the deposition
situation as F alone has at trial.
B. F RECOGNIZES THE PRIVILEGE; D DOES NOT
1. Cases where the deposition state is also the state with the
most significant relationship to the communication
In most situations involving depositions, the deposition state
will also be the state with the most significant relationship to
the communication. Since the communicating parties are likely
to be most closely connected with C, that is often the state to
which the litigants must go to take depositions.
The conflict centering around a privilege designed to encour-
age open communication is easy to resolve. It has already been
121. In some situations, a potential choice of law problem is avoided
because the privilege rules of the two states are not significantly differ-
ent. Although a court faced with such a situation might discuss the
choice of law question, there is obviously no need to decide which state's
law should apply.
For example, in one older case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kauf-
man, 104 Colo. 13, 87 P.2d 758 (1939), the Colorado court seemed to rest
its decision on the rule that the forum state's law should govern, but
the opinion then noted that the choice of law determination was unim-
portant because the statute of the forum state, Missouri, was almost iden-
tical to the statute in Colorado, the deposition state. Id. at 15, 87 P.2d
at 759.
A more recent case, Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967), took an even more cautious approach. The main
action was brought in Illinois, and plaintiff sought to depose a New York
attorney in New York. Although the communications were made in New
York, the court refused to express an opinion on which state's attorney-
client privilege should apply, noting only that application of either privi-
lege would mandate the same result. Id. at 556-57.
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demonstrated that F has no legitimate interest in applying its
own "encouraging communications" privilege at trial in a situa-
tion where C would not honor the privilege claim. 122  F is
even less justified in recognizing the privilege when the testi-
mony is to be elicited on deposition in D. In this case, then, there
is no reason for F to honor the claim.' 23
The situation is a little more complicated when the justifica-
tion for the asserted privilege is the protection of privacy. If
the privilege claim were made at trial in F, the court would,
in most circumstances, be correct in recognizing it. 2 4 In the
present situation, however, since the testimony will be taken on
deposition in D, F's strong policy of not interfering with the sanc-
tity of certain relationships may not be as seriously offended
by allowing the deposition to proceed as it would be if the testi-
mony were admitted at trial. On the other hand, if the court
in F permits the testimony to be elicited, it will be sanctioning
an intrusion into the privacy of a relationship in violation of F's
public policy. Thus, when F has a strong privacy-based privi-
lege, the court should not be expected to ignore F's own privi-
lege rules.
The result should be the same if the question is before D's
courts rather than F's. D has no strong public policy against com-
pelling disclosure; but then D also has little interest in assuring
accurate adjudication. On this basis alone, D should honor F's
privilege. The practical value of compelling disclosure in this
situation might also be minimal. At trial, F may refuse to admit
evidence procured in violation of its own confidential com-
munications privilege, making the effort to obtain the testimony
useless.' 25 This reaction on F's part would be appropriate, for
122. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
123. Similarly, when the deposition state is not the state of most
significant relationship, but neither state recognizes a privilege, there is
no reason to apply F's privilege.
124. Note, however, that whether F would recognize it would depend
on the strength of F's policy against intrusion into privileged relation-
ships. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra. If F would not be justi-
fied in applying its own privilege at trial, it cannot extend its privilege to
testimony received on deposition in D. Thus, the issue addressed in the
text is a difficult one only when F has a strong policy against violating
confidences transmitted within the scope of the privileged relationship.
When the policy is weak, F's privilege should give way, and testimony
should be compelled.
125. The cases indicate that the forum might refuse to admit the
testimony. See, e.g., In re Meyer's Estate, 206 Misc. 368, 132 N.Y.S.2d
825 (Surr. Ct. 1954), a case in which the court refused to allow certain
interrogatories to be submitted to an out-of-state physician on the ground
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it would tend to discourage other states from improperly com-
pelling disclosure in the future.
D-C, then, should honor F's privilege when it is based on a
privacy rationale, but not when the privilege only encourages
communications. The case law, however, is not settled on these
points. If a court errs in its preliminary determination that the
privilege would apply if the claim were made at trial in the
forum state, its final holding that the privilege claim should also
be honored on deposition loses significance, because the reasoning
supporting the holding is based on a false premise. For this rea-
son, several seemingly relevant cases provide little guidance on
privilege claims at the deposition stage.
126
Levy v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 127  by contrast,
illustrates the situation in which D and C coincide and neither
recognizes the physician-patient privilege. In that case, the court
of the forum, New York, which did recognize the privilege,
granted a motion for an order directing issuance of a commission
to take testimony in Georgia. This was entirely proper,
1 28
because New York's interest in encouraging communications in
Georgia was slight1 29 and was heavily outweighed by its inter-
est in obtaining relevant and otherwise admissible evidence.
In re Franklin Washington Trust Co.'3 0 is another case in
which the court reached a desirable result. Plaintiff, in a New
Jersey action, sought to take testimony in New York from
lawyers who claimed an attorney-client privilege. The New York
court denied the claim on the ground that under New York law
no privilege would apply because the testimony fell within the
that they would not be admissible at trial in New York. See also Wexler
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942), in
which the court, in refusing to allow testimony of physicians to be taken
on deposition in New Hampshire, noted that "[tihe public policy of this
state does not permit the use of such evidence." Id. at 890 (emphasis
added).
126. See Hare v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 953
(D. Md. 1971); Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 252 App. Div. 646, 300
N.Y.S. 721 (1937); In re Meyer's Estate, 206 Misc. 368, 132 N.Y.S.2d 825
(Surr. Ct. 1954); Wexler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 889
(N.Y. City Ct. 1942). The problems in these cases have already been
analyzed in notes 57 & 60-63 supra.
127. 56 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The case is discussed in notes
58-59 supra and accompanying text.
128. For some of the complications in the case, see note 59 supra.
129. The Levy case predated the privacy justification of privileges;
thus the privilege at issue here was almost certainly based on an "en-
couraging communications" rationale. See note 86 supra.
130. 1 Misc. 2d 697, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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fraud exception to the privilege.' 3 ' Since New York was not
interested in encouraging communications in furtherance of
fraud, and since the parties could not have relied on the
privilege,13 2 there was no reason to suppress the testimony. 3 3
The result in Hill v. Huddleston,3 4 a more recent federal
case, is questionable. While a personal injury action was pending
in Tennessee, defendant sought to take the deposition of a psy-
chiatrist who had treated plaintiff in Maryland. The psychiatrist
declined to testify, and the defendant sought the assistance of
the Maryland federal district court to compel disclosure. Under
Maryland law, there had apparently been a waiver of the privi-
lege, while under Tennessee law, the communication would have
remained protected. 3 5 The court, citing a tentative draft of the
Second Restatement, concluded that no privilege should be recog-
nized.'3 6 If the sole justification for the privilege here was the
desire to encourage open communication with one's physician, the
decision would have been beyond reproach.13 7 If, on the other
hand, there was a privacy aspect to this privilege, 3 8 the claim
should have been honored.'3 9
2. Cases where the state of the most significant relationship is
the same as the forum state
In the much more unusual case 40 in which C coincides
131. Id. at 699, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
132. Since the communications were apparently made in New York,
and New York recognized no privilege, there could have been no justifi-
able reliance.
133. If New Jersey's attorney-client privilege existed to assure pro-
cedural fairness in litigation, see notes 22-24 supra and accompanying
text, even for communications made in furtherance of a fraud, the New
York court would have been less justified in compelling testimony.
However, there is no evidence in the opinion that the Court thought New
Jersey's privilege was so broad.
134. 263 F. Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1967).
135. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1956 & Supp. 1975).
136. In the absence of a controlling Maryland decision, this court
believes that the proper conflicts rule and the rule which would
be adopted by a Maryland court is that the court of the deposi-
tion state should apply the law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the communication; in this case that
state is Maryland.
263 F. Supp. at 110.
137. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
138. This privilege is supportable on a privacy basis, see note 35
supra. It is possible, however, that the Tennessee courts did not recog-
nize that basis for the privilege.
139. See text following note 69 supra; text accompanying notes 75-
76 supra.
140. The situation is rarely presented because if the forum is also
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with F,141 D should honor F-C's "encouraging communications"
privileges. It has already been established that F should recog-
nize C's privileges when they are justified by C's policy of encour-
aging open communications within the scope of certain relation-
ships, 14 2 because C's interests in encouraging communications,
combined with the reliance interests of the communicating
parties, outweigh F's interest in facilitating accurate fact-finding.
This argument also applies when D, rather than F, must decide
whether to respect the privilege claim, for D's interests are no
greater than F's. In fact, D has much less interest in assuring
accurate factfinding than does F because it has no real stake in
the outcome of the litigation. Hence, when both C and F recog-
nize a privilege, D should defer to F-C's position.
When F-C's privilege is based on a protection of privacy
justification, D should also recognize it. Since D should honor F's
privacy-based privilege even when C recognizes no privilege,
because the trial court in F will probably refuse to admit the
testimony, 143 the case for recognition is even stronger when F's
policy is also C's.14 4  Therefore, when the forum state is also
the state of most significant relationship, the deposition state
should always defer to the forum state's privilege.
In re Cepeda,145 the only case relevant to this point,
reached this result in a well reasoned opinion. Orlando Cepeda,
the baseball player, responded to media criticism of his baseball
performance by instituting a libel suit in California. He then
sought to depose Cohane, a reporter who had played a major
role in assembling the allegedly defamatory material, in order
to obtain evidence on Cohane's sources of information. Although
the relevant communications apparently took place in California,
which had a journalist-source privilege, Cepeda sought to take
the state of most significant relationship, the parties to the communica-
tion will be available at trial, and there will be no need to take deposi-
tions in another state.
141. This analysis also applies where C and F are different states,
both of which would honor a privilege claim under these circumstances.
142. See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
144. Thus, even when F's privacy-based privilege does not rest on
a particularly strong public policy, see notes 70-71 supra, if F is also
the state of most significant relationship, its privilege should be honored.
Although the deposition state might wish, for the sake of ease of admin-
istration, to allow the deposition, its interest is rather small in compari-
son to the combined F-C interest in protecting the privacy of the com-
municants.
145. 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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the deposition in New York, a state which had no such privilege.
The court refused to accept the argument that New York's privi-
lege law should apply, noting:
To apply the law of New York merely because of the fortuitous
circumstance that it happens to be the place of the taking of
the deposition, would merely encourage forum-shopping in the
sense of attempting to take a deposition in a state which does
not recognize the privilege.146
Although on the facts of the case, the court concluded that Cali-
fornia could not recognize a privilege either,14 7 that does not
diminish the importance of the court's analysis.1 48
C. D RECOGNIZES THE PRIVILEGE; F DOES NOT
In the usual case the deposition state is also the state in
which the communications took place, and D-C must honor its
own privileges, whether they are based on promoting open com-
munication or on protecting privacy. Clearly, if D-C's own courts
refused to enforce its privileges designed to encourage communi-
cations, people would be deterred from communicating openly,
thus undermining the state's policy. 49 D-C courts would also
146. Id. at 471.
147. Id. at 473. In construing a California privilege statute that
granted immunity to persons associated with a "newspaper" or "press
association," the New York court found it necessary to rule that the de-
ponent was not covered by the statute since he worked for a bi-weekly
periodical.
148. In fact, the holding of the Cepeda case may be much broader.
The court almost seems to indicate that whenever there is a conflict be-
tween the privilege laws of F and D, the law which recognizes the privi-
lege should be applied. As Judge Tenney commented:
I submit that the law of the place of the trial should also, save
in the situation where the deposition state recognizes a privilege,
govern the validity and scope of the privilege asserted....[I]t is a state's affirmative action in carving out a privilege cre-
ating an exception to a general rule of testimonial compulsion
which constitutes the enunciation of a strong public policy in
favor of the protection of certain communications, whereas the
refusal to recognize a privilege is merely the application of the
general rule of compulsion to testify to all facts affecting a spe-
cific controversy.
Id. at 470.
This is an overgeneralization. When a state has a strong public pol-
icy favoring testimonial compulsion, how can it express that policy ex-
cept by omission of a privilege statute? If the court's words are taken
literally, they would compel recognition of privileges in many inappro-
priate situations.
149. When D and C are separate states with the same privilege pol-
icy, this factor is less important. Nevertheless, since F would honor C's
"encouraging communications" privileges, see text preceding note 80
supra, D should honor the privilege as well.
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violate the state's policy if they participated in an intrusion on
a privacy right that the state carefully protected.150 In either
case, D-C's interest in recognizing the privilege outweighs F's in-
terest in obtaining the testimony.
Where D is not the state of most significant relationship but
is only, by happenstance, the residence of the party to be deposed,
the situation is somewhat different. As long as neither C nor
F recognize the privilege, D should not apply its own privileges
designed to promote open communications. D has only a minor
interest, if any, in encouraging communications in C, and the
combined interests of F and C in having the testimony admitted
are weighty.
1 5 1
When D's privilege is based on a privacy rationale, D has bet-
ter reason for honoring it. The question is close, however,
because D has little interest in the litigation, and F's interest in
accurate factfinding may be significant enough to override D's
interest in honoring the privilege. 1 52 In any event, this situa-
tion is unlikely to arise in practice, for when the forum is also
the state of most significant relationship, the parties are likely
to be available in F, and there would be no need for a deposition
inD.
The case law, not unexpectedly, deals exclusively with the
situation in which D-C recognizes a privilege and F alone does
150. Even if C's status as the state of most significant relationship
is not always sufficient to support application of its privacy-based privi-
leges at trial in F, see text accompanying notes 92-94 supra, when the
testimony is to be solicited in C as well, the balance of interests shifts.
Since D-C's privilege is based on a desire to protect privacy rights within
the scope of a given relationship, D-C has a particularly strong interest
in recognizing its privilege when both the original communication and
the deposition take place in the state.
151. The situation facing the court is analogous to the case of a trial
in F in which the court is faced with a choice between its own privilege
and C's lack of privilege. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
152. This situation is different from the one in which F applies its
own privacy-based privilege when C would not honor one. In the latter
situation, see text preceding note 70 supra, F has determined, as a matter
of state policy, that the value of maintaining confidentiality outweighs
whatever positive effect on accurate factfinding admission of the testi-
mony would have. Here, on the other hand, D has a policy favoring
confidentiality. The court must weigh D's policy favoring confidentiality
against F's interest in accurate factfinding. These interests have not
been weighed by the legislature or courts of either state.
In the unlikely event that D, although not the forum state or
the state of most significant relationship, does have substantial con-
tacts with the litigation, it will have a somewhat stronger interest in
applying its own privacy-based privilege.
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not.153  Only in the previously criticized case of Abety v.
Abety154 was a clearly undesirable result reached. There, it
will be recalled, a New Jersey court ruled that defendant could
obtain hospital records on deposition in New York despite a New
York statute that protected such information. This type of rul-
ing invites a clash with a court of the deposition state, which
might decide to permit the records to be withheld. In Abety,
New York's privilege policy should have been respected.
Other cases have taken a more enlightened approach. In Ex
parte Sparrow,'55 plaintiff brought a libel action in New York,
which, at the time, recognized no journalist's privilege. 15
Sparrow's deposition was to be taken in Alabama, the state of
most significant relationship, which did protect such information.
The court felt that in the absence of any federal privilege rule,
the Alabama public policy in favor of recognition should pre-
vail.157
In Palmer v. Fisher,'58 the main action was pending in
153. The opinions in these cases do not always specifically identify
the state of most significant relationship. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d
603 (7th Cir. 1955), involved an Illinois accountant's assertion of the
accountant-client privilege, but the opinion does not explicitly iden-
tify where the communication took place or where the accountant-client
relationship was centered. Presumably, the relationship was centered
in Illinois, the deposition state.
In re Queen, 233 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962), involved a New York
psychologist's assertion of a New York privilege on deposition in New
York for use in a Massachusetts action. Again, the assumption appears
to be that the communication and the relationship were centered in New
York, but that is not made explicit.
154. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
155. 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
156. N.Y. CrVIL RiGHTS LAW § 78-h (McKinney Supp. 1975), now pro-
vides a journalist-newssource privilege.
157. Although the result was proper, the court displayed less wisdom
in the following excerpt: "It is conceded that the sources of information
given to a journalist are not privileged under the law of New York and
that if Sparrow were to appear as a witness there, he could and would
be compelled to disclose his sources of information." 14 F.R.D. at 353.
New York should have honored the Alabama privilege as well. The
court in Sparrow had not yet entirely departed from the old rule
that the law of the forum governed in evidentiary matters; rather, it con-
cluded that the deposition state was actually the forum for purposes of
the privilege determination. Id.
Another interesting facet of the Sparrow case was the court's un-
willingness to characterize privileges as substantive for Erie purposes,
although it did decide to apply state law. Id. See generally Korn, supra
note 1.
158. 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955). In this diversity case, the Seventh
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Florida, but Fisher sought to secure the testimony of Pierce, an
Illinois accountant, on deposition in Illinois. Pierce asserted the
Illinois accountant-client privilege and the court held that Illinois
law applied. The communications in question were apparently
originally made in Illinois, 15 9 but, from the tone of the opinion,
that fact was not particularly important to the court's decision.160
Even though Palmer and Sparrow illustrate somewhat dog-
matic approaches to this situation, hinting that the deposition
state should always apply its own privilege rules, the ultimate
results are obviously appropriate. As long as these cases are read
for their holdings, rather than for their language and reasoning,
they are unobjectionable. 6"
By the time In re Queen'0 2 was decided in 1962, the appeal
of the rigid principles set forth in Palmer had apparently
diminished. 6 3 In that case, during a child custody action in
Massachusetts, plaintiff-husband sought testimony from his
wife's psychologist on interrogatories in New York. New York
had a psychologist-patient privilege, while Massachusetts did not.
The initial communications appear to have taken place in New
York, 64 and the court held that the New York privilege
applied. Although the court's discussion of the choice of law
Circuit classified privileges as substantive for Erie purposes, or, under
a narrower reading, held that state privilege statutes should be followed
in federal courts, whether or not Erie compelled this result. See note
160 infra.
159. See note 153 supra.
160. For example, the court reasoned:
The state legislature had declared it to be public policy .. that
public accountants shall not be required to testify about infor-
mation obtained in their confidential capacity as accountants.
This policy would be defeated if any court, state or federal, sit-
ting in Illinois should require an accountant to testify as to such
information. This would be true whether the testimony was to
be used in a court sitting in Illinois or in any other state.
228 F.2d at 608.
Furthermore, the court sought to reconcile its position with the old
rule that the law of the forum determines admissibility by noting that
a proceeding to suppress a deposition (the procedural posture of this
case) was an independent action, thus making Illinois the forum state.
Id. at 608-09.
161. To the extent that the reasoning assumes relevance as a guide
to later judicial decisions, it is important to expose its faulty basis.
162. 233 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
163. See generally RESTATaMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLIT OF LAWS
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). See also Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E.2d 99 (1954) ("grouping of contacts" theory applied rather than rigid
rules of First Restatement).
164. See note 153 supra.
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issue was not lengthy, its decision properly emphasized an evalu-
ation of the rights of citizens 0 5 instead of the old rule that
the law of the forum governed questions of evidence.166
R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass16 7 also adopted a well-reasoned ap-
proach. There, the court of the forum state, Georgia, was willing
to defer to the anti-spousal privilege of the deposition state,
Pennsylvania. The court noted that the anti-spousal privilege
reflected a strong Pennsylvania policy, and that, in light of this,
the Pennsylvania courts would probably not allow the deposition
to proceed. 68 This case is particularly important because here
the forum state, rather than just the deposition state, recognized
that D's interests were paramount and that the privilege should
be honored. The case thus represents a direct repudiation of the
rule of Abety v. Abety. 16 9
Although the introduction of a third state, D, complicates the
analysis, the court asked to decide whether to recognize a particu-
lar privilege for purposes of a deposition should proceed as out-
lined above. When the forum state and the deposition state have
the same policies toward a privilege, the previous framework de-
veloped for the trial stage of the litigation should be applied.
When the deposition state is, or has the same policy as, the state
with the most significant relationship to the parties and the liti-
gation, D should recognize both encouraging communications and
privacy-based privileges when it recognizes them and F does not,
but it should only honor privacy-based privileges that F recog-
nizes and it does not. If D is neither the forum nor the state
of most significant relationship, it should honor all F's privileges
even if it does not recognize them. It should also defer to F
when it recognizes privileges and F does not, although application
of D's own privacy-based privileges may sometimes be justified.
165. The court declared that "it is obvious, that to grant the relief
presently sought would be violative of the rights of a citizen of our
state." 233 N.Y.S.2d at 799. One year later, In re Walsh, 243 N.Y.S.2d
325 (Sup. Ct. 1963), took substantially the same approach as Queen in
a case involving the attorney-client privilege.
166. It should be noted that the court did not explicitly reject the
First Restatement position, but, instead, shifted emphasis to other con-
siderations.
167. 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The case is also discussed
in notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 761.
169. 10 N.J. Super. 287, 77 A.2d 291 (Super. Ct. 1950). The weak-
nesses of this case are discussed at text accompanying note 154 supra




Different testimonial privileges further different societal
goals. When deciding whether to apply the privilege law of a
foreign state or of the state in which it sits, a court must look at
the policies underlying the privilege laws. The court must bal-
ance the various individual and state interests involved. This
balancing process will not always yield clear-cut, easy results,
but neither will it create the inequities that flow from the use of
a rigid rule like the First Restatement's edict that the law of
the forum must determine the admissibility of evidence.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws has brought a
more flexible approach to this area of law and is a significant
step in the right direction. The Second Restatement formulation,
however, is not without its flaws. Its phraseology tends to mini-
mize the importance of privileges as reflections of basic state poli-
cies.
In the future, courts should consider more carefully the
individual interests and public policies involved in any privilege
determination. It is crucial to ascertain the rationale for the
privilege rule at issue. Once this has been done, courts should
seek to protect reliance and general expectation interests of the
parties to the communication. Similarly, when a privilege rule
is an expression of a state's strong public policy, this factor, too,
must be considered.
This Article has sought to provide guidance to the courts
for making difficult choice of law decisions. Such decisions can-
not be made by simple application of an arbitrary rule. Only
careful consideration of all the interests involved in each type
of privilege claim can provide fair answers to choice of law ques-
tions relating to testimonial privileges.
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